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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
VERNON s. CHEEVER and
CHARLIE GAROFOLO,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.

Case No.

1514 7

ORVAL R. SCHRAMM and
HAROLD L. CHRISTENSEN,
Defendants and
Appellants.

**************
APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL

**************
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by a Seller of an auto
repair business against the Buyer for a breach of contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried in the lower Court, and the Court
found that a Sales contract existed between the parties, and awarded
the selling party damages for breach of contract by the Buyer, and
dismissed the Buyer's Counterclaim.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendants seek a reversal of the findings of
the lower Court.

The Defendants also seek to have the case

remanded for a determination of the Defendants' damages herein.
In the alternative, the Defendants seek to have the case remandi
for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 1, 1976, the Defendants entered into an
Earnest Money Agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) R., Page 94, cor
cerning the purchase of the C

&

B Sports Car Service Center, wh:

was being operated by the Plaintiffs.
with TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS

This Agreement was secur1

($200.00) paid by the Defendants to th1

Plaintiffs at the time the Earnest Money Agreement was executed
(TR., Page 16) •

The Earnest Money Agreement was subject to sev1

conditions precedent, which are explained· in detail in Appellan
Argument No. 1.

The Defendants entered into possession of the

premises of the business on February 9, 1976.
23-27).

(TR., Page 19, L

On February 18, 1976, nine (9) days after taking the b

the balance of the agreed on SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS ($6,000.00) P
chase price was paid over to the Plaintiffs by the Defendants.
Page 21, Lines 26-30).

On or about March 10, 1976, for the fir

time, a Lease Agreement, which was to be the underlying and bas
agreement between the parties, was presented to the Defendants.
(TR., Page 70, Lines 23-30).

Within five

(5)

to eight (8)

da~
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after the Defendants had an opportunity to review the intended
Lease Agreement between themselves and Siscon Investment company,
the LESSOR, the Defendants, vacated the premises.

(TR., Pages 50-51).

Plaintiffs then sued the Defendants for breach of contract, and
the lower Court upheld the Plaintiffs' claim, and dismissed the
Defendants' Counterclaim.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
TO THE FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT HAD BEEN MET.
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §24, states:
"In negotiating a contract the parties may
impose any condition precedent, the performance of which is essential before they become
bound by the Agreement; in other words,there
may be a condition precedent to the existence
of a contract. Reduction of the Agreement to
writing, or to a different form may be a condition precedent to its taking effect. It has
been held that parties to a written contract
may agree that the contract is not to be operative until the happening of an oral condition,
and consequently that it may be shown that the
contract did not become operative because the
parol condition was not fulfilled. A promise,
or the making of a promis~,may be conditioned
on the act or will of a third person. Where
both parties know and understand that a writing
is not to ripen into a contract until the happening of a condition precedent, such as the approval
of the contract by the parties attorneys, acts
of the parties may not be interpreted as an assent
to the writing."
(Emphasis added).
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If there be any doubt as to what was intended by
the parties, as to the Agreement they entered into on February
1976, it is clear that any doubt must be resolved against the
Plaintiffs in this action, as the Plaintiffs drew up the
and selected the language.

(TR., Page 17, Lines 13-16).

Agree~

(See

Bryant v. Deseret News Publishing Company, 120 U 241, 233 P2d
Seale Tayco Inc., 16 U24 323,400 P2d 503 (1965), Skousen v.

3~

Sm~

27 U2d 169, 493 P2d 1003 (19721.

In this case, the validity of the contract entered:

by the parties was expressly conditioned upon the happening of'
(5) events.

Four (4) of which were contained in the only

between the parties; namely, the Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.

writ~

These

conditions precedent are:
1. That Siscon Development (Sic) Corp. accept the
Defendants as suitable tenants. (Line 31, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1
R, page 94.
2. That the Plaintiffs' Lease be taken over by the
Defendants.
(Line 22, Plaintiffs' Exhibit l)T R, page 94.
3. That a contract of sale, or instrument of conveyance be made in the approved form of the Utah Securities
Commission.
(Line 35, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). R, page 94.
4. That an inventory of equipment and supplies of
the business be supplied.
(Line 14-15, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1).
R, page 94.
5. That Plaintiff CHARLIE GAROFOLO provide thirty
forty-five (30-45) days of assistance in operation of the busin
after Defendants took control of the business.
(TR., Pages 83·

None of the above five (5) conditions were proved

t

have been fulfilled by the Plaintiffs.
1.
heresay

The Plaintiffs introduced through inadmissable

evidence that the Defendants were accepted by the LE~
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as suitable tenants, but no officer of Siscon Investment Corp.
even testified as to acceptance of the Defendants as suitable
tenants.

(TR., Page 26, Lines 19-22).
2.

The Defendants were not allowed by the Plaintiffs

to take over the Plaintiffs' Lease with Siscon Investment Corp.,
3: instead the Plaintiffs attempted to get Siscon Investment Corp.,

it to re-negotiate an entirely new Lease with the Defendants.

(TR.,

Page 53, Lines 12-20).
3.

No formal Sales Contract or instrument of convey-

ance was ever executed by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants as was
ir

required as a condition of the February 1, 1976, Agreement.
Page 74, Lines 4-6, and
4.

(TR.

I

Line 35 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, R, page 94)

No inventory of equipment or supplies of the

business was ever delivered to the Defendants as was required as a
condition precedent by the parties' February 1, 1976, Agreement.
(TR., Page 40, Lines 9-11, & Page BS, Lines 11-16).
5.

(B,

page 94)

There is no evidence on record to rexute the state-

ments of Defendants that CHARLIE GAROFOLO agreed to provide thirty
to forty-five (30-45) days of assistance in operation of the business after Defendants took control of the business.

While in fact,

1.

ir.

l·

Mr. Garofolo stayed only two to three (2-3) days; coincidentally,
long enough to get his money.

(TR., Page 86, Lines 22-29).

Therefore, while four (4) conditions precedent were
expressly mentioned by the parties in their only written document,
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1), and the fifth (5th) was orally agreed to
by the parties, none of those conditions have been proved by the
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Plaintiffs with competent evidence as having been fulfilled.
This Court has clearly stated that the parties must
be bound by conditions which they write into their contracts.
The case of Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc., 22 U2d 202,
450 P2d 743

(1969) states:
"Generally speaking, neither of the parties
to a contract, nor the court have any right
to ignore or modify conditions which are
clearly expressed merely because it may subject one of the parties to hardship, but they
must be enforced in accordance with the intention as manifested by the language used."
Also see Ephraium Theater Company v. Hawk, 7 U2d

163, 321 P2d 221 (1958).
To allow this Agreement between the Plaintiffs and
Defendants to take effect without the fulfillment of the condit
precedent thereto is clearly contrary to the authority

establ~

by Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc., Supra, and Ephraium
Theater Company v. Hawk, Supra.

Therefore, the trial Court err

and should be reversed as a contract never arose between the pa
and the Defendants are not liable to the Plaintiffs for any bre
of contract.
POINT

II.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS DID
MISREPRESENT THE BUSINESS OR ITS OPERATION TO THE DEFENDANTS.
The essential elements of proving a fraudulent mim
sentation as found by this Court in the cases of Pace, et al v.
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t

Parrish, et al, 122 U 141,247 P2d 273 (1952), Stuck v. Delta Land
&

Water,63 tJ 495,247 P'791,(l924),Jones v. Pingree, 73 U 190, 272

P 303

(1928) are:
1.

That a representation was made;

2.

concerning a presently existing material fact;

3.

which was false;

4.

which the misrepresentator either,
a.
b.

5.

.knew to be false, or
made wrecklessly knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation;

for the purpose of inducing the other party to

act upon it;
6.
'.that the other party acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity;

7.

did in fact rely upon it;

8.

and was thereby induced to act;

9.

to its injury and damage.

In this case there are a total of five (5) material
misrepresentations made by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants.

They

are:
1. That the Plaintiffs were operating the business
at a profit of $10,000.00 per month.
(TR., Page 83, Lines 4-6).
2. That the Plaintiffs' business was so good that
they did not need to advertise any longer.
(TR., Page 82, Lines
26- 30).
3. That the employees were being paid a commission,
when in fact they received weekly salaries.
(TR., Page 83, Lines
9-13).

4.

That the loan the Defendants were to assume was
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in the amount of $9,400.00, (TR., Page 80 & 84), when in fact,
the loan amount was $11,500.78.
(TR., Pages 89 &90).
5. That the value of the equipment of the business
was $12,000.00 to $14,000.00, (TR., Page 82, Lines 16-25), wher.
in fact the value of the equipment was around $2,500.00.
(TR.,
Page 85, Lines 1-10).
All five (5) of the above representations were madE
to the Defendants, and each one represents a presently existim
material fact, and all five (5) of the statements are false.
As to the falsity of the statements, the evidence
which has been introduced by the Plaintiffs in the form of Plai
Exhibit No. 7,

(R, page 95. ) , clearly establishes that the

business of the Plaintiffs was not doing well.

The business

records indicate that for the calendar year 1976, the Plaintifi
had gross sales of $10,156.55.

Those same records indicate tha

the Plaintiffs had non-capital expenses of $12,491.60, for
period of time.

t~

In addition to these non-captia 1 expenses, thE

Plaintiffs had expended $3,179. 76 for capital items, which woui
make a net deficit for the three (3) month period of operation
the year 1976, of $5,514.81.
rebuts

The evidence on its face clearly

the testimony of the Plaintiffs in stating that the bu!

ness had done well under their operation, when in point of fac1
they had lost over $5,000.00 in the first three (3) months of
operation.

Even if one assumes that all of the capital items

~perating supplies)

are still on hand, and were not expend~

the business, there would have been a cleficit of $2,333.05, fo:
the three (3) months of operation.
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Therefore, it is clear that the business was not
operating at a $10,000.00 profit, either net or gross, and
L

there wasn't sufficient business to quit advertising.

Also, it

is clear from the evidence that the employees were receiving
salaries, and not commissions.

(TR., Page 88, Lines 15-23).

The evidence is also clear that the loan the Defendants were to assume was in fact for an amount much greater than
was represented to the Defendants by the Plaintiffs.

(TR., Pages

8 0, 8 4, 8 9 and 9 O) •
The evidence clearly shows that the value of the
equipment of the business was greatly misrepresentated by the
Plaintiffs.

(TR., Pages 82 & 85).
All five (5) statements had to have been known by the

Plaintiffs to be false at the time they were made as they had
prepared and held the business bookkeeping records, and had paid

lt

the employees.
The only possible reason for making the statements
was to induce the Defendants to purchase the Plaintiffs' business.
The statements did in fact induce the Defendants to sign the

l!

Earnest Money Agreement in reliance on the statements to their
detriment,

(TR., Pages 87, 88, 89, 97, 98, & 99), and they were in

fact damaged by agreeing to purchase a losing operation.

(TR.,

Pages 85 &86).
Therefore, all of the elements of fraud are present.
A fraud sufficient for recision of the contract, and
damages caused thereby has been found by this Court

~or

a single
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misrepresentation which is the same as one of the five (5)
misrepresentations involved herein.

Specifically, in the case

of Beyener v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 598 P2d 898 (197 0
,which

involved

the sale of a small business in which the

Sellers misrepresentated to the Buyers the amount of income the
business had been grossing, this Court held that a fraud had be
perpretrated upon the Buyer by the Sellers sufficient to allow
Buyer to rescind the contract and receive damages.

The Court

stated in that case:
"In view of these facts, Defendants (Sellers)
urgency - that Plaintiffs (Buyers) should
have learned what the facts were is indeed
intriguing to one's sense of justice. The
law does not generally approve nor give any
advantage to one who intentionally deceives
another, obstructs him from learning the facts,
and then attempts to impute fault and responsibility to the other party for believing him."
(Emphasis Added)
The case presently before the court is an even
stronger case for a finding of fraud by the Sellers.

This case

involves five (5) misrepresentations, and there was a timely
abandonment of the present premises by the Buyer upon his reah
zation of the fraud that was involved.

Yet, the lower Court

refused to grant recision or damages to the Defendants herein.
Instead, the lower Court rewarded the wrongdoers by giving th~
damages for successfully carrying out their fraud upon the
Defendants.
As stated by the Court in the case of Crompton v.
Beedle,

83 VT 287, 75 A. 331 (1910)
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"In the case of active misrepresentation it
is no answer, in proceedings either for
damages, or for setting aside a contract, to
say that the party complaining of the misrepresentation had the means of making inquiries"
•••• "No man can complain that another has too
implicitly relied on the truth of what he himself
has stated."
Further, 17 Am Jur, Contracts, §151 states:
"It is said that if consent is obtained by
meditated imposition or circumven~ion, it is
to be treated as a delusion, and not as a
deliberate and free act of the mind. Although
the law will not generally inquire into men's
acts and contracts to determine whether they
are wise and prudent, yet it will not suffer
them to be entrapped by the fraudulent contrivences or cunning or deceitful management of
those who purposely mislead them. Fraud is
material to a contract where'the contract would
not have been made if the fraud had not been
perpetrated."
(Emphasis added)
Such is the case here, where the Defendants have been
defrauded by the Plaintiffs.

And here the Defendants, therefore,

sought recision of their contract by abandoning the business, and
do hereby seek recision thereof with damages for the fraudulent acts
of the Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in finding that a valid contract
of sale existed between the parties.

This is so because the condi-

tions precedent to the formation of the contract established by
the parties in their preliminary agreement were not fulfilled.
Therefore, a valid Sales Contract between the parties never arose.
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Even if the conditions precedent to the formation of
a Contract had been fulfilled by the parties, the Plaintiffs'
fraudulent misrepresentat:ions to the Defendants made the Contr<
void and rescindable by the Defendants at their option.
Therefore, the Defendants seek to have this Court
reverse the decision of the Lower Court, and remand the case fo
a determination as to the amount of Defendants' damages to be
awarded.

Or, in the alternative, the Defendants seek to have

this case remanded for a new Trial.
Respectfully Submitted,
RAY M. HARDING
Attorney for Appellants
59 West Main Street
American Fork, Utah 84003

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of
the foregoing Appellants' Brief on Appeal to Respondents'
attorney, Cullen Y. Christensen, 55 East Center Street, Provo,
Utah 84601 on this

p!i

day of June, 1977 postage prepaid.
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